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Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information

Pocket • 1995 • Engelsk

Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information

Av Jon Vislie

0 vurderinger • 0.0 av 5

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Om boken

Om boken

ISBN

9788257090753

Forlag

Oslo : University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Publiseringsår

1995

Språk

Engelsk

Originaltittel

Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information

Format

Pocket

Frakt og retur

Frakt

Brukte bøker sendes av selgeren. Forventet leveringstid etter pakken er sendt er 2-4 dager.

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Omtaler · 0

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